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1 Introduction
Varieties of the "new institutionalism" hold a promise of theoretical integration across
several sub-disciplines of the social sciences and a wide range of research fields,
including comparative politics, the study of European integration, comparative political
economy, comparative industrial relations, or comparative industrial governance (Hall &
Taylor 1996; Jupille & Caporaso 1999; Thelen 1999). There are thus good reasons to
explore the usefulness of institutional explanations in comparative policy research as well.
But in doing so, we need to be aware of the special conditions that complicate their
application in this particular field. To begin with, it seems useful to specify the ways in
which institutionalist and policy perspectives may intersect.
The policy perspective focuses on two different questions which I described as being
"problem-oriented" and "interaction-oriented" (Scharpf 1997, 10-12). Under the first
perspective, policy research will analyze the nature and the causes of (societal) problems
that (public) policy is expected to resolve as well as the (empirical or potential)
effectiveness of policy responses to these problems. Quite obviously, much of thesubstantive knowledge required in problem-oriented policy analyses will not come from
political science but from other disciplines, such as macro-economics, labor-market
economics, public health, biology or climatology. Within the perspective of interaction-
oriented policy research, by contrast, political-science knowledge is likely to dominate
analyses of the interactions among policy makers, and of the conditions which favor or
impede their ability to adopt and implement those policy responses which problem-
oriented analyses have identified as being potentially effective. Similarly, the study of
institutions also includes two distinct perspectives, one focusing on the consequences that
institutions may have for actors and actions within their domains, the other one focusing
on the genesis of and transformation of institutional arrangements themselves. If we
combine these perspectives in a fourfold table, it is clear that interesting research
questions may in fact be located in all four cells.
In the first cell, one would locate "functionalist" attempts to explain the existence of
specific institutions by their ability to solve certain societal or economic problems - a
perspective which, for instance, informs the institutionalism of transaction-cost
economics (Williamson 1985). In the second cell, the perspective is reversed, asking how
the existence of given institutions contributes to the emergence or avoidance of certain
societal or economic problems - a perspective adopted by "structuralist" studies which,
for instance, are attributing differences in the rate of inflation to the existence or absence
of centralized wage-setting institutions (Calmfors & Driffil 1988) or of independent
central banks (Cukierman 1992). In the third cell, research could focus on how
institutional change may be explained as the outcome of strategic interactions among
purposeful and resourceful actors - a perspective which, for instance, has been highly
productive in explaining major institutional changes in the European Union as the
outcome of strategic interactions among national governments (Moravcsik 1998).
The fourth cell, finally, identifies the perspective on institutions that is characteristic of
interaction-oriented policy research. It treats institutions as one set of factors affecting the
interactions among policy actors, and hence the greater or lesser capacity of policy-
making systems to adopt and implement effective responses to policy problems. This is
the perspective adopted in the present article. It differs from the "structuralism" in cell 2
by its actor-centered character. Actors and their interacting choices, rather than
institutions, are assumed to be the proximate causes of policy responses whereas
institutional conditions, to the extent that they are able to influence actor choices, are
conceptualized as remote causes (Scharpf 1997). But since actors differ in their
orientations and capabilities, and since we also need to take account of the problemperspective, the search for, or the use of, institutional explanations faces characteristic
difficulties in the context of in interaction-oriented policy research. These difficulties will
be discussed in the following section before I will then turn to the uses of institutional
explanations in comparative policy studies.[1]
2 The Elusive Quest for Generality
To a greater degree than is otherwise true in the social sciences, policy research aspires to
pragmatic usefulness in the sense that it should be able to provide information which (if
heeded by policy makers - which is another question altogether) could contribute to the
design of effective and feasible policy responses to given societal problems. At the
practical end of a continuum, this calls for in-depth analyses of specific policy problems
and interaction constellations that may best be done by consultants or by the in-house
staffs of ministerial departments and other policy-making organizations, rather than by
theory-oriented academic research. At the same time, however, such applied work would
greatly benefit from being able to draw on empirically validated theoretical propositions
specifying general causal mechanisms affecting the feasibility and effectiveness of policy
options
Given the multi-dimensionality and variety of real-world policy problems, however, any
general theoretical proposition can at best cover partial aspects that need to be integrated
with other partial theories in the development of effective policy designs - just as the
solution of any complex engineering problem will draw on a wide range of distinct
natural-science theories. But in policy research even the search for partial theories is
affected by the real complexity of its subject matter. While the natural sciences can often
rely on experimental designs in order to isolate the causal effect of a single factor, this is
not usually possible in the social sciences. Here the comparative empirical study of real-
world phenomena is generally our only way to discover causal relationships. But
regardless of whether comparison is inter-temporal, cross-sectional, or cross-national
(which will be my focus here): If institutional conditions are thought to matter, they are in
themselves very complex "factors" with a high degree of variability across time and
space. Moreover, if the dependent variable is to be policy responses, interaction-oriented
policy research must also consider at least two additional sets of factors that are likely to
have causal influence - the characteristics of the policy problems faced, and the
characteristics of the policy actors involved. These conditions constrain the design of
theory oriented and empirical policy research (Scharpf 1997, chapter 3).
The standard way of dealing with complex factor constellations in empirical research is
through multivariate statistical analyses that seek to identify the causal effect of specific
variables while trying to control for the influence of other factors. Since internationally
comparative policy studies are inevitably plagued with the "small-n problem" of too many
variables and too few cases, it has become common practice to multiply the number of
available observations by relying on cross-country pooled time-series data (Beck & Katz
1995). Their usefulness is limited, however, by the fact that some of the factors that
influence outcomes may be both country-specific and relatively stable over time, so that
the multiplication of observations does not increase the available information to nearly the
same degree. The same is true if exogenous shocks (like the oil-price crises of 1973-1975
and of 1979-81) affect all countries at the same time. If these "fixed effects" are then
accounted for by the introduction of country and year dummies in the regression
equations, what is left is statistical information about relationships among variables that
are cleaned of all influences that are specific for a given country or a given time period.In the field of comparative political economy, there is a growing and methodologically
sophisticated literature relying on these remedies for the small-n-disease. They seem most
useful for the identification of stable ceteris-paribus relationships of an essentially
"structural" character. Examples are studies of the relative influence of economic growth,
trade openness, capital mobility and other "economic" factors on the one hand, and of the
political and organizational strength of left-of-center political parties, of labor unions, or
corporatist institutional arrangements and other "institutional" factors on the other hand,
on levels of taxation and social spending (Rodrick 1997; Garrett 1998; Garrett & Mitchell
1999; Hicks 1999). Similar methods are used to assess the effects of wage dispersion on
private service employment (Iversen & Wren 1998), of central-bank independence on
inflation (Cukierman 1992 ), or of more or less centralized wage-setting institutions on
inflation and unemployment (Calmfors & Driffil 1988; Soskice & Iversen 1999; Iversen
1999). From the perspective of developing politico-economic theory, these are very
useful studies, even though their reach is constrained either by the availability of
quantitative time-series data that are cross-nationally standardized, and by the need to
reduce complex qualitative factors to quasi-quantitative indicators or to dummy variables.
From a policy perspective, however, the information that is screened out through the use
of country and year dummies in pooled cross-section time-series regressions may be
more important than the statistical regularities that are discovered. Exogenous challenges
may change radically over time, and even if all countries were confronted with the same
challenge at a given time (say, the dramatic rise of real interest rates in the international
capital markets of the early 1980s), countries with different economic and social
structures, and with different policy legacies may differ greatly in their vulnerability and
hence in problems that their policy systems must deal with. Moreover, even where these
"fixed effects" play no role, the information used in multivariate regressions is generally
too "thin", and the probabilistic effects identified are too uncertain to provide much
guidance for policy choices in specific historical constellations.
Turning instead to historical studies of single cases, which may do justice to the
complexity of interacting factors, cannot be the answer, since these will not allow lessons
to be derived for other cases, let alone cumulative theory development.[2] For some
purposes, it may be useful to combine deductive theoretical work and statistical analyses
of some empirical indicators with case studies that explore the more complex specific
antecedent conditions (Coppedge 1999). An example is Iversen's (1999) theoretical and
econometric analysis of the joint effects of (accommodating or non-accommodating)
monetary policy regimes and (more or less centralized) wage-setting institutions on
inflation and unemployment, backed up by more detailed historical explorations of
developments in a few European countries. Here, statistical analyses are used to identify
probabilistic regularities, while the influence of various (and changing) institutions on
policy choices is presented in the narrative mode. For Iversen's purposes, that seems a
perfectly valid solution.[3]
But what if we are primarily, or at least equally, interested in empirically supported
generalizations about the influence of a greater variety of policy-making institutions on
the capacity for effective policy responses in a wider range of policy areas? From what I
have said, it follows that comparative case studies are likely to be better suited to this task
than multivariate regressions based on quantifiable data and indicators. But it also follows
that in order to arrive at potentially generalizable conclusions, we must then find ways to
cope with the excessive variety and complexity of causal constellations. This can often be
achieved by focusing the comparison on a subset of cases in which it is possible to holdother contingent conditions sufficiently constant to allow the influence of institutional
variations to be identified with some confidence. But in order to do so, we must have a
theoretical understanding of the contingencies that we are trying to hold constant.
3 Contingencies
The effect of institutional conditions on the effectiveness of policy choices is contingent
on two broad sets of non-institutional factors - the nature of the problems or challenges
that policy is supposed to meet and the normative and cognitive orientations of policy
actors involved. Both are generally ignored in "structuralist" theories asserting the
unconditional superiority or inferiority of certain policy-making institutions, such as
"neo-corporatism" or the "Westminster" model.
Thus the multiple-veto characteristics of German political institutions may indeed impede
policy changes (Tsebelis 1995) - but compared to the stop-go policies facilitated by the
single-actor British political system, this condition favored successful German economic
policy from the 1950s to the end of the 1980s. In the 1990s, however, when new
economic challenges would have required major policy changes, the same institutional
conditions are considered causes of German policy failures (Manow & Seils 2000).
Conversely, institutional conditions and the challenges arising from the external policy
environment did not change between 1978 and 1979 in Britain, or between 1983 and
1984 in New Zealand. Nevertheless, radical policy changes were brought about by new
governments whose cognitive and normative orientations differed from those of their
predecessors (Rhodes 2000; Schwartz 2000). Both of these contingencies can be specified
more precisely.
3.1 Policy Challengens
In the political economy of advanced welfare states, policy challenges are themselves a
complex concept that is best defined by the interaction among three sets of factors -
changes in the policy environment impacting on more or less vulnerable socio-economic
structures and on more or less vulnerable policy legacies.
For examples of recent changes in the policy environment, one may think of the two oil
price crises, of the fall of the Berlin Wall, of the completion of the European internal
market and of the European Monetary Union, but also of demographic changes resulting
in the "graying" of the population, or of changes in family structures increasing the labor-
force participation of women. Such changes will often affect several or many countries at
the same time. But whether and how these will lead to policy problems is likely to be
conditioned by the characteristics of domestic socio-economic structures and policy
legacies.
The importance of differences in socio-economic structures is obvious: The second oil-
price crisis constituted a different type of policy challenge for oil-exporting Norway than
it did for oil-importing welfare states. Similarly, the Danish economy, which is dominated
by small, family-owned enterprises, was less affected by recent increases in capital
mobility than was true of Sweden, where large, multinational enterprises play a major
role (Benner & Vad 2000). The second set of mediating factors is described by the
concept of policy legacies (Skocpol & Weir 1985) which refers to existing policies and
the practices, and expectations based on them. Since their theoretical importance is less
obvious, a clarification seems useful.
Even though policy legacies are the product of past political choices, they are notnecessarily at the disposition of present policy makers. For one thing, not everything can
be changed at the same time in modern, highly differentiated policy systems. In any one
policy area, therefore, the body of existing policy in other areas must mostly be
considered an invariant environment of present policy choices. But even where changes
are considered, they are likely to be impeded by policy inertia. In multi-actor policy
systems with high consensus requirements, innovators will be at a competitive
disadvantage in interactions with the beneficiaries and defenders of the status quo
(Scharpf 1988). But even if formal (majoritarian) decision rules do not have a
conservative bias, the status quo is favored by the fact that a proposed innovation must
not merely appear superior in the abstract, but that the expected gains must be big enough
to also cover the costs of transition - and that these are likely to increase with the extent
to which the new policy would depart from status-quo solutions. In extreme cases, the
status quo may be protected by "lock-in effects" (David 1985; Arthur 1989; 1990), and
even when policy change is feasible, it is likely to be "path dependent" (Pierson 1996;
1997; Thelen 1999) in the sense that only certain goals can be reached from a given
starting position.
As a consequence, similar changes in the policy environment may constitute problems
differing in nature or in severity, depending on the accidental goodness-of-fit between
these changes and existing national policy legacies. Thus, the policy problem generated
by the first oil-price crisis was massive job losses in countries like Germany, where the
monetary regime was non-accommodating, while rampant inflation became the dominant
problem in Britain and other countries with an accommodating monetary legacy (Scharpf
1991). Similarly, the "graying of the population" constitutes a massive financing problem
in welfare states whose earnings-related pensions are financed by the "pay-as-you-go"
contributions of a shrinking active population, whereas "funded" pension systems are
much less threatened. Under conditions of increasing international competition and capital
mobility, moreover, the characteristic differences in the policy legacies of Scandinavian,
Continental, and Anglo-Saxon welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990; 1999), of national
production systems (Soskice 1999; Estevez-Abe et al. 1999) and of industrial-relations
systems (Crouch 1993; Golden et al. 1999) have come to matter very much for the
problem load that must be faced by national policy systems (Scharpf 2000a; Scharpf &
Schmidt 2000).
3.2 Actor Orientations
In combination, external changes impacting on given socio-economic structures and
policy legacies will create time and country-specific patterns of vulnerabilities which, in
democratic polities, are transformed into challenges to which policy actors may have to
respond. That these responses are influenced by the institutional setting is generally
assumed, but the dominant strands of current institutionalist theorizing, "rational-choice
institutionalism" and "sociological institutionalism" (Hall & Taylor 1996; Thelen 1999),
[4] differ in their conceptualization of these influences, even though both make quite
strong claims about the value of institutions as predictors of what actors will in fact do.
In sociological institutionalism, institutions are defined very broadly, so as to include not
only externally imposed and sanctioned rules, but also unquestioned routines and
standard operating procedures and, more importantly, socially constructed and culturally
taken-for-granted world views and shared normative notions of "appropriateness" (Berger
& Luckmann 1966; March & Olsen 1989; DiMaggio & Powell 1991; Zucker 1991). In
that view, therefore, institutions will define not only what actors can do, but also their
perceptions and preferences - and thus what they will want to do.In rational-choice institutionalism, by contrast, institutional rules are understood as
external constraints and incentives structuring the purposeful choices of self-interested
rational actors (Shepsle 1989; North 1990). But since actors are also assumed to have
standardized and stable preferences defined by their personal or organizational self-
interest, and since they are assumed to be rational in the sense that their perceptions can
be taken to be correct representations of the objective situation, and that their cognitive
capabilities are sufficient to identify the consequences of available options for their self-
interest, the knowledge of institutions will also allow predictions and explanations of
what actors will in fact do. As George Tsebelis (1999a, 4) has put it: "Since institutions
determine the choices of actors, the sequence of moves, as well as the information they
control, different institutional structures will produce different strategies of the actors,
and different outcomes of their interactions."
In the light of empirical policy research, however, both of these theoretical positions
appear much too deterministic.[5] Above, I referred to the examples of Britain in 1978/79
and New Zealand in 1983/84, but the point can be stated more generally: Even if external
and institutional conditions remain constant, policies can change if the cognitive and
normative orientations of policy makers change - as they did when Keynesianism was
replaced by monetarist and neo-liberal economic paradigms (Hall 1992; 1993). In our
own framework of "actor centered institutionalism" (Mayntz & Scharpf 1995; Scharpf
1997), we therefore find it necessary to treat actor orientations (i.e., their preferences and
perceptions) as a theoretically distinct category - influenced, but not determined by the
institutional framework within which interactions occur.
In our view, actor preferences[6] have at least two dimensions, individual and
organizational self-interest on the one hand, and (internalized) normative obligations and
aspirations on the other hand.[7] In the organization-theoretic literature, this corresponds
to the distinction between "system maintenance" and "goal attainment" (Etzioni 1964, 16-
19), and there it is generally assumed that in cases of conflict the former takes precedence
over the latter.[8] In any case, the "goals" of corporate and collective actors are strongly
influenced by the institutional rules to which they owe their existence and by institutional
and cultural norms which define the criteria of their success or failure.[9] For that reason,
they will vary greatly between different types of actors - political parties, government
ministries, unions, central banks, etc. -, and in time and place. By contrast, the
"maintenance" or survival interests in assuring adequate organizational resources,
defending organizational autonomy, and (where institutionally relevant) achieving
competitive success, are likely to be more uniform and constant - which allows fairly
general and reliable predictions of organizational responses to institutional incentives
(and hence useful suggestions for institutional design).[10]
Like actor preferences, cognitive orientations are also shaped by institutional norms and
incentives defining the role-specific content of "conventional wisdom" and "selective
perceptions" (Dearborn and Simon 1958). Central banks will pay more attention than
union leaders to early indicators of inflation. Moreover, certain policy areas may be
dominated by the specific paradigms (Hall 1993) of particular "advocacy coalitions"
(Sabatier 1987; 1999) or "epistemic communities" (Haas 1992). Beyond that, the capacity
for effective policy responses is affected not only by the quantity and quality, but also by
the diversity of policy-relevant information and analysis provided by an institutionalized
information infrastructure. Thus, in the heyday of Austro-Keynesianism in the 1970s,
policy coordination in Austria was greatly facilitated by the fact that the government, the
political parties and the social partners relied on the analyses provided by a single
economic research institute. In Germany, by contrast, unions and employers maintainseparate research institutes, the federal government and the Länder support altogether six
such institutes; the federal labor administration as well as the Bundesbank maintain large
in-house research capacities, the independent Council of Economic Advisors relies on its
own research staff, and the big commercial banks also have their own macro-economic
research departments. All of these provide not only data, explanations, and policy
recommendations for their respective sponsors, but they also publish their often
inconsistent findings and contradictory interpretations - which are then debated in the
financial press and in the economic and financial pages of the general press, and which
allow very different policy proposals to claim "scientific" support.
The downside of the monopoly model are, of course, the risks of "groupthink" (Janis
1972) - that is, of the failure to pay attention to observations, interpretations and
recommendations that do not conform to the dominant world view. This was arguably the
case in Britain in the early 1970s, when policy makers in the Treasury continued to rely
on the Keynesian recommendations derived from the single macro-economic simulation
model even though the economy had ceased to respond as predicted (Hall 1992). But
when the analyses of institutionalized information monopolists do fit the problem (and if
they are believed) they will facilitate effective problem-solving in single-actor systems
and effective coordination in multi-actor systems. The pluralistic model, by contrast, will
provide protection against the institutionalization of error. But the cacophony of voices
may render coherent policy choices difficult even in single-actor systems, and is likely to
work against cooperative or at least coordinated problem solving in multi-actor systems.
4 Dimensions of Institutional Effects
We thus have three major sets of variables that will affect the capacity of a system to
come up with effective policy responses: the nature of the policy problem, the orientations
of policy actors, and the characteristics of the institutional setting. Since each of these
will vary greatly over time and space, comparative policy research will be faced with a
dilemma: If we try to cover a variety of significant policy choices in a larger set of
countries (say, the usual OECD-18 set), the number and diversity of distinct factor
constellations will overwhelm available methods of multivariate statistical analysis as
well as Ragin's (1987) Boolean "qualitative comparative analysis". And if we try to
instead select our cases by the logic of "most similar systems" or "most different systems"
designs (Przeworski & Teune 1970) in order to identify the influence of a single set of
factors, we are likely to end up with very few cases at best. Thus, focusing on Britain in
1978/79 or on New Zealand in 1983/84 does in fact allow us to identify the influence of
actor orientations while problems and institutions are held constant. Similarly, in my
"Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy" (Scharpf 1991), I selected four
countries (Austria, Britain, Germany and Sweden) which during the 1970s were faced
with the same problems of "stagflation", and which at the time had governments with
strong preferences for the maintenance of full employment and with cognitive orientations
shaped by the Keynesian paradigm. Within this design it was then relatively easy to relate
differences in policy choices to differences of institutional structures (in particular,
central-bank independence and concentrated or fragmented collective bargaining
institutions).
4.1 The Need for Institutionalist Working Hypotheses
In comparative policy research, however, we want to study a larger population of
countries and policy choices, or seek to explain cases selected for their topical interest,
rather than by the logic of a variance-controlling research designs. Still, for the reasons
discussed above, a purely empirical approach would not serve our purposes. Instead, wemight rely on theoretically grounded working hypotheses, rather than empirical research,
for some causal influences in order to simplify and guide our empirical search for other
explanatory factors. Preferably, these should be hypotheses with high predictive power -
meaning that they should allow us to form precise expectations about significant causes
and effects on the basis of relatively limited and easily obtainable information (Scharpf
1997, chapter 1).
Such hypotheses are clearly not available for all factors involved in our complex
constellations. We have no general theory that would allow us to predict the occurrence
of policy problems or the characteristics of effective solutions. These need to be
identified by case-specific problem and policy analyses. Similarly, we have no general
theory predicting the type of institutional settings within which policy interactions take
place. They also need to be identified empirically in the specific cases at hand. But once
we have obtained both of these sets of empirical information, we can use them to
formulate theoretically grounded expectations of the policy responses which we should
expect under the circumstances.
Substantive problem and policy analyses will generate policy recommendations of a
prescriptive character which, however, can be converted into empirically relevant
predictions if they are coupled with the assumption that the perceptions of all policy
actors are identical with those of the policy analyst, and that the preferences of all policy
actors are exclusively defined by a normative commitment to maximizing the public
interest as defined by the policy recommendations of the analyst. If these (unrealistic)
assumptions were true, institutions would only play a very limited role. But since we
have reason to think that institutions matter, we also need hypotheses that predict their
influence on the effectiveness of policy responses.
This influence is most obvious where formal institutional rules impose direct constraints
on the repertoire of permissible policy choices. But we expect that within this repertoire
the actual choice among permissible options is also affected by institutional rules
prescribing actor constellations and modes of interaction, and by institutional incentives
and disincentives affecting actor preferences. For formulating such predictions, rational-
choice institutionalism has a clear advantage over the less information-efficient
sociological variety. Its predictive power depends precisely on its narrow focus on the
incentive-effect of institutional rules on organizational self-interest and on the assumption
of complete information and adequate information processing capacity. Thus, if we know
how the organizational self-interest of specific policy actors would be affected the
available responses to given policy challenges, and if we know the actor constellation and
the applicable rules of the game, we can then apply a range of analytical (essentially
game-theoretic) tools to predict the policy outcome that interactions between rational and
self-interested policy actors would produce in the specific case.
From what was said above, it follos of course that both of these predictions are based on
unrealistic assumptions and thus will often be false. But that does not mean that they
would be useless.[11] I will return to this point in the concluding section, and now turn to
a brief overview of the institutional hypotheses that are likely to play a major role in
comparative policy studies.
4.2 Constraints on Permissible Policy Options
Countries differ in the range of institutionally permissible policy options. An example is
the power of governments to determine wages and working time - an option which was
routinely exercised by Belgian governments in the 1980s and 1990s, and which isavailable in most other countries as well, but which is ruled out in Germany by the
constitutional guarantee of collective bargaining. Similarly, the judicial interpretation of
the German constitution imposes narrow constraints on the permissible extent of property
taxation, and it is claimed to rule out a Scandinavian-type "dual income tax" which
would tax capital incomes more lightly than incomes from other sources. Admittedly, the
German case represents an extreme example of legalism-cum-judicial-activism, but
similar legal fetters - for instance on the public debt - can be found in other constitutional
democracies as well.
More important for most countries is the increasing tightness of international legal
constraints. Thus, the blatant protectionism which shielded import-substituting
industrialization in Australia and New Zealand well into the 1980s (Schwarz 2000) would
now be liable to massive legal sanctions by the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Similarly, the tight control of capital transfers, and the highly discriminatory regulation of
credit markets which facilitated the success of macro-economic full-employment
strategies in Sweden until the mid 1980s (Benner & Vad 2000), would now be ruled out
by EU directives liberalizing capital markets and financial services. More generally, the
rules of "negative integration" and in particular, European competition law have become
a major constraint on all economic-policy options that could be construed as inhibiting or
distorting free competition in the markets of EU member states (Scharpf 1999a). And
countries that have joined the European Monetary Union not only had to transfer their
monetary competencies to the (totally independent) European Central Bank, but they also
had to accept legally binding constraints on their fiscal-policy options. As a consequence,
the option of achieving full employment through Keynesian strategies of demand reflation
is no longer available at the national level among EMU member states.
4.3 Actor Constellations and Modes of Interaction
In addition to imposing substantive prohibitions, institutional rules also define the
constellations of actors that may participate in the adoption and implementation of policy
responses as well as their permissible modes of interaction - which could be classified as
"mutual adjustment", "negotiated agreement", "voting" or "hierarchical direction"
(Scharpf 1997). Together, these rules determine the most basic and policy-relevant
characteristic of the institutional setting, namely the number of formal "veto positions"
(Tsebelis 1995). In extreme simplification, one may thus speak of "single-actor
constellations " in which all relevant policy choices are potentially determined by the
preferences and perceptions prevailing in a unified action center, or of "multiple-actor
constellations" in which effective policy depends on the choices of several independent
actors that may be acting from separate and potentially conflicting preferences and
perceptions.[12] Here, policy can be blocked at multiple veto positions, and effective
action will depend on negotiated agreement. The theoretical expectation is that,
everything else being equal, the adoption of policy changes will be more difficult in
multiple-actor than in single-actor constellations.
In practice, most policy choices result from multi-actor interactions. But some countries,
whose political institutions approximate the ideal "Westminster model", have the option
of treating any major policy problem in a single-actor constellation (Wilson 1994). In
other words, hierarchical direction is an institutionally available mode of interaction[13].
This ideal type was approximated in Britain under Thatcher, and in New Zealand until the
1993 reform of the electoral system, but despite the existence of coalition governments,
France also comes close to the single-actor pattern (Schmidt l996, chapters 1 and 2).
Germany, by contrast, is characterized by a multi-actor constellation with coalition
governments and a bicameral parliament at the center, autonomous subnationalgovernments, an independent central bank, an independent constitutional court, and with
constitutional guarantees of autonomous collective bargaining by unions and employers'
associations, and an even more extreme example of a multiple-veto system is the Swiss
combination of bicameralism, all-party coalitions, and the referendum.
4.4 Institutions as Structures of Incentives
Institutional rules will affect policy responses not only by restricting options and by
constituting actor constellations and regulating their modes of interaction but also by
structuring the incentives of the participating actors. In rational-choice institutionalism,
these incentives are defined by reference to the self-interest of the corporate and
collective actors involved in the policy process - e.g., governments, political parties,
central banks, labor unions, their sub-units or the individuals acting for them.[14] In
single-actor systems, the incentives that have the most direct effect on policy choices are
constituted by the mechanisms of political accountability. In multi-actor systems,
accountability is weakened, and policy outcomes are more affected by incentives favoring
cooperation or conflict among the veto-actors.
4.4.1 Accountability Incentives
Accountability is most clearly institutionalized in Westminster-type political systems in
which all policy competencies are concentrated in a central government whose choices
are controlled by the winner in periodic two-party electoral competition. Under the
restrictive assumption of a one-dimensional and single-peaked distribution of voter
preferences, this model creates incentives for self-interested governments to adopt
policies corresponding to the preferences of the median voter (Downs 1957), and under
even more restrictive assumptions of complete information all around, these policies
would maximize aggregate welfare (Mueller 1989). It should not be forgotten, however,
that under the same complete-information assumptions, and in the absence of transaction
costs, the Coase-Theorem predicts that welfare-maximizing outcomes would also be
achieved in consociational democracies through negotiations among parties and
associations representing the interests of affected groups (Coase 1960; Scharpf 1997,
chapters 6 and 8). Under idealized conditions, in other words, democratic accountability
would assure effective policy responses in multi-actor as well as in single-actor
constellations.
In the real world, however, policy information is incomplete and contested, and inter-
group negotiations are impeded by high transaction costs. Under these conditions, it is
plausible that voters as well as the members of organized interest groups will oppose
policy changes whose immediate impact on their status-quo interest position is negative.
Then the institutions of democratic accountability create incentives favoring policies
maximizing short-term benefits and avoiding short-term costs for voters and interest
groups - which may prevent the adoption of effective policy responses to manifest
problems. But the extent to which this is likely varies with the specifics of institutional
arrangements.
For one thing, an increasing number of countries have exempted certain policy functions
from the control of democratically accountable governments and legislative majorities -
by providing constitutional courts, independent central banks or cartel offices with a
greater, though surely not unlimited,[15] freedom to pursue unpopular policies. To an
even greater (and from the perspective of democratic accountability much more
problematic) degree, this is also true of the European Central Bank, of the European
Commission, and of the European Court of Justice in its role as interpreter and guardian
of Treaty obligations - under institutional rules where its interpretation of the Treatiescould only be reversed by unanimous agreement among member governments that needs
to be ratified by the parliaments of all member states (Scharpf 1999a). On the other hand,
the negative incentive-effect of democratic accountability increases with the proximity of
elections and their expected salience for the parties in power. Thus, the fact the legislative
term was shortened to three years in 1970 is said to have reduced the capacity of Swedish
governments to govern from a long-term perspective (Immergut 1999), and in France
shorter intervals between parliamentary and presidential elections have been shown to
affect the willingness of governments to maintain potentially unpopular initiatives (Bonoli
1997). In Germany, the government is even less insulated from short-term electoral
pressures since the four-year parliamentary term is punctuated by altogether 16 Land
elections that affect the partisan composition of the Bundesrat. By contrast, the realization
of Margaret Thatcher's radical reforms benefited from the five-year interval between
general elections, and even more from the fact that she was facing a divided opposition
which, under first-past-the-post election rules, practically ruled out electoral defeat.
It is clear, then, that national institutions differ greatly in the extent to which they expose
governments to incentives favoring policies responding to short-term voter reactions,
rather than strategies which, though initially unpopular, may demonstrate their
effectiveness and convince voters in the longer term. But it should be kept in mind that,
first, the organizational self-interest that is affected by these incentives does not
circumscribe the full range of action-relevant preferences. Political parties and
governments may be committed to normative goals and role obligations that will override
electoral concerns - as was true of the Lubbers coalition government in the Netherlands
which stuck to its unpopular retrenchment program in the face of practically certain
electoral defeat in 1994 (Visser and Hemerijck 1997). Even more important, governments
are not necessarily helpless when faced with negative voter reactions. They may be able
to engage opposition parties, organized interests, the media and the general public in
policy-oriented discourses that explain and justify the course of action that is proposed
and the sacrifices associated with it. Again, however, their capacity to do so is influenced
by institutional conditions - it is greater in single-actor polities, where the government
can speak with one voice, than it is in multiple-veto constellations where policy choices
will often have the character of compromises among conflicting goals that are difficult to
justify from the positions of any one of the parties involved in their adoption (Schmidt
2000).
4.4.2 Incentives to Collaborate in Multi-Actor Systems
Depending on whether unilateral policy action is, or is not, a realizable option, it is useful
to distinguish between two variants of multi-actor systems: In the first case, which one
may call "policy fragmentation", some of the instruments of public policy that are
required for the adoption of a successful policy response to a given problem are not under
the control of a single actor but are exercised by independent agents - a formally
independent constitutional court, a de-facto independent central bank or cartel office,
autonomous subnational governments, and in Europe, the EU Commission and the
European Court of Justice. The effect of policy fragmentation is, first, to limit the range
of policy options which a single actor may unilaterally adopt and implement and, second,
to raise the possibility that mutually inconsistent unilateral policy choices will interfere
with each other; and even if some coordination is achieved by actors responding to others'
choices in the mode of "mutual adjustment", the outcome may still be suboptimal.[16] If
that is to be avoided, coordination through negotiated agreement[17] among independent
actors may be required.
In the second case, which I have called "joint decision making" (Scharpf 1988), none ofthe parties is allowed (or physically able) to act unilaterally. Here, effective policy
responses can only be adopted and implemented with the agreement of several
independent actors. That may be true even in single-party governments if ministers are
representatives of intra-party factions that cannot be ignored by the prime minister, or if
ministries enjoy a large degree of constitutional autonomy so that policy conflicts among
them must be resolved through inter-ministerial negotiations or through the cabinet as a
collegiate body (Mayntz & Scharpf 1975). In coalition governments, the agreement of
separate political parties, each with its own policy goals and organizational self interest,
is generally necessary for important policy choices (Budge & Laver 1993), and in
bicameral legislatures the second chamber may have a veto that is exercised by partisan
majorities differing from those in the first chamber.
Given that no policy system is truly single-actor, the difficulties of effective action
depend, of course, on the substantive convergence or divergence of policy preferences
among the veto players involved (Tsebelis 1995; 1999b). In contrast to mutual
adjustment, the Coase-Theorem (Coase 1960) assures us that in the absence of
transaction costs negotiations are able to achieve efficient outcomes in all constellations
where potential gains from cooperation exist. But since transaction costs are never absent,
the probability of agreement depends very much on issue-independent incentives favoring
cooperation or conflict that are inherent in different institutional settings.
General incentives for cooperation should be strongest within single-party and unitary
governments of the Westminster model. Even if intra-party factions may compete with
each other for policy influence and career opportunities, and even if individual ministerial
departments may enjoy considerable autonomy, all office holders of the governing party
must win or lose elections together, and thus should have strong incentives to cooperate
on successful policies. Similar incentives also exist among the parties in a coalition
government that should have a common interest in the success of their government. But
since each of them must ultimately face its own clienteles and voters separately, there are
also incentives to sharpen one's own profile through tough bargaining strategies and even
open conflicts within the coalition - which may then delay, distort, or even block effective
solutions. Blockage is more likely in the "end-game" phase of an election period than in
the "honeymoon" of a new coalition, and it is generally more likely in multi-party
systems with an expectation of rapidly changing governing coalitions - so that unilateral
concessions in the interest of longer-term cooperation are unlikely to have high future
payoffs. This was true of multi-party coalition governments in the French IVth Republic,
and of Italian governments before the early 1990s, whose capacity for effective policy
responses was generally very low. By contrast, the Danish multi-party system seems to
have evolved into a pattern of relatively stable minority governments that are free to seek
the support of variable ad-hoc majorities for their policy initiatives, and that are thus able
to achieve a remarkably high degree of problem-solving capacity ( Benner & Vad
2000).[18] Thus, its ad-hoc coalitions may be formed exclusively on the basis of
convergent substantive policy interests, whereas longer-term government coalitions are
usually based on agreements that rule out voting with the opposition against another
coalition party - with the consequence that effective policy responses may be blocked
within the coalition even though they would have majority support in the full parliament.
At the opposite extreme are constellations of "divided government" where institutional
incentives favor conflict, rather than cooperation. This is true in bicameral legislatures,
when partisan majorities in both houses are opposed to each other (Laver & Shepsle
1991; Krehbiel 1996). Somewhat similar conditions may obtain in all constitutional
democracies when effective policy solutions require constitutional amendments[19] thatcan only be passed by super-majorities including parties in opposition to the government
of the day. Under these conditions, even compromises that would advance the substantive
policy goals of the opposition may be blocked. Since governments and opposition parties
are engaged in zero-sum competition for the votes of the same electorate, the opposition
has not only a substantive interest in promoting its own policy goals through favorable
compromises, but also a competitive interest[20] in defeating government initiatives in
order to undermine its reputation for competent and successful political action. Thus
conditions of divided government are particularly unfavorable for effective but unpopular
policy responses with a high party-political salience (Laver & Shepsle 1991; Alt &
Lowry 1994).[21]
In between these extremes are located attempts to achieve effective policy responses
through "joint decision making" between governments and independent public agencies
or social-partnership organizations, or among different national or subnational
governments with autonomous jurisdictions and separate constituencies (as is true of
negotiations in the EU Councils of Ministers). Here, agreement is not facilitated by a
generally shared interest in the success of a joint venture, but neither is it impeded by
disincentives arising from political competition. As long as each party is unchallenged in
its own institutional domain, self-interested cooperation on substantive solutions has a
chance under the "Coase Theorem" whenever the policy goals pursued by all parties are
better achieved through concerted, rather than through separate action. In fact, much
public-sector problem-solving does occur in the form of agreements among local or
regional or national governments, and the important achievements of European
integration are best explained in terms of intergovernmental agreements as well
(Moravcsik 1998).
Going beyond the Coase Theorem (which presupposes that agreements can only be
achieved if all parties involved will benefit from it), long-standing patterns of successful
substantive collaboration may create additional generalized incentives to maintain
cooperation even if one or the other party must accept short-term sacrifices to its own
institutional or policy interests. Such incentives are said to explain the long-term success
of social-partnership institutions in Austria (Marin 1987; Heinisch 1999). Nevertheless,
even institutionalized "corporatist" cooperation cannot be taken for granted. The
breakdown of "Concerted Action" in Germany in the early 1970s (Scharpf 1991, chapter
7), the complete, but temporary, suspension of coordinated wage setting in the
Netherlands during the 1970s (Visser & Hemerijck 1997), and the erosion of centralized
wage setting in Sweden in the 1980s (Compston 1995; Pestoff 1995) demonstrate that
generalized incentives are unlikely to maintain cooperation in the face of sustained
conflicts over either policy goals or institutional self-interest among the parties involved.
5 Strategies for Comparative Policy Research
This overview of hypotheses regarding institutional incentives and their policy-relevant
effects on organizational self-interest of corporate and collective actors could be extended
from the arenas of parliamentary and intergovernmental interaction to other arenas in
which important policy choices are determined - e.g., interactions in monetary policy,
industrial relations, or European regulation. Moreover, the hypotheses themselves could
and should be formulated with greater differentiation and precision regarding the
assumed organizational self-interest of different types of actors and the likely incentive
effects of different types of institutional arrangements. Given the deductive methods of
rational-choice institutionalism, the formulation of such hypotheses would not poseserious difficulties - and given a suitable data base, some of these hypotheses may also be
corroborated by statistical analyses (see e.g., Bawn 1999; Tsebelis 1999b).
As I emphasized above, however, in the specific case the hypotheses derived from
rational-choice institutionalism will often turn out false. So what is the role that they
could and should play in comparative policy research that is less interested in statistical
probabilities than in explaining the outcomes of individual cases? The answer is that
having such hypotheses is as useful for comparative case studies as having a regression
line in a scattergram is for the exploration of quantitative relationships: It focuses
attention on the "residuals" - i.e., on cases where the prediction is not confirmed.
In fact, from what I said about the relationship between problem-oriented and interaction-
oriented policy research, it follows that we are able to work with two different sets of
theory-based hypotheses: On the one hand, problem-oriented policy analyses predict the
choices we should expect if all policy actors had complete information and were
exclusively motivated to realize public-interest maximizing outcomes. On the other hand,
rational-choice institutionalist analyses predict the choices we should expect if all policy
actors had complete information and were exclusively motivated to realize self-interest
maximizing outcomes. If these two predictions agree, we could conclude that institutional
incentives are favoring the adoption of effective policy responses to the problem in
question. If they disagree, such responses are made more difficult by institutional
obstacles. But since (multi-purpose) political institutions can rarely be optimized with a
view to specific policy problems, [22] this abstract evaluation of institutional incentive-
effects is not our main concern.
However, empirical policy research benefits very much from being able to compare the
observed outcome of policy interactions to these two theory-based predictions, both of
which rely on highly stylized assumptions about actor orientations. If the outcome should
agree with either of these, we could content ourselves with having obtained a satisfactory
explanation. But when that is not the case (i.e., most of the time), we now have at least a
clear idea of where to search for explanations. Since both the nature of the problem and
the institutional incentives have already been accounted for, the explanation must be
found in actor orientations that differ from the stylized assumptions underlying our
predictions. Thus we now must seek empirical information on the actual preferences and
perceptions of the policy actors involved.
More specifically, we should seek for cognitive orientations that deviate from the
information and cause-and-effect hypotheses of the substantive problem and policy
analyses which we consider to be true. At the same time, we should also seek for actor
preferences that differ from either the perfectly public-interested or the perfectly self-
interested motivations assumed in our hypotheses. In doing so, it is often very useful - in
the spirit of Lindenberg's (1990) "method of decreasing abstraction" - to begin by
focusing on the institutionalized "norms of appropriateness" that are emphasized by
sociological institutionalism (March & Olsen 1989), and to move on to searching for
more idiosyncratic normative orientations and identity concepts only when the more
stylized institutional hypotheses fail to explain choices. In any case, however, the
discrepancy between theoretical predictions and observed policy choices will guide and
greatly simplify the empirical search for those preferences and perceptions that actually
can explain the failure to adopt effective policy responses.
To give an example: After the Bundesbank had switched to monetarism in the mid 1970s,
all countries that had pegged their currencies to the German mark (Austria, Denmark, theNetherlands, and Belgium) were confronted with the same hard-currency environment
which, in the absence of union wage restraint, would produce high unemployment. When
faced with this challenge, rational-institutionalism would tell us, the centralization or
fragmentation of wage-setting institutions should not matter: Large or small unions alike
should find it in their organizational self-interest to save the jobs of their members
through wage restraint. In Germany and Austria, this is what happened within a year or
two, whereas collective bargaining in Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands continued
to generate wage inflation even under conditions of steeply rising unemployment. Since
institutional incentives cannot explain these differences, the comparison would then have
to focus on the influence of cognitive misperceptions and normative (ideological)
orientations that prevented the unions in some countries, but not in others, from fully
appreciating the impact of a change in (German) monetary policy on their own
employment situation (Scharpf 2000b).
The example has several interesting implications for research strategies: First, what
counts as a "case" in comparative case studies depends on what is to be explained. In
comparative policy research, that is trying to explain differences in policy response to a
given challenge, the case is defined by the set of interactions connecting the challenge to
the response. Since the historical processes we are studying contain a considerable variety
of (often nested) policy challenges, we have considerable freedom in selecting sets of
cases which, at minimum, are similar with regard to the policy challenge that was being
faced. In the example, we could have focused on the full set of countries that were
members in the European currency "snake" in 1973/74, asking why some of them
responded to the German switch to monetarism by quitting the snake, whereas others
maintained their commitment to a hard-currency position. Among the subset of soft-
currency countries, we could then compare responses to the challenge of escalating rates
of inflation; among the hard-currency countries, in turn, comparison would focus on
responses to rising unemployment, and so on. Among these sets defined by similar
challenges, moreover, it should usually be possible to identify subsets of cases that have
additional causal factors in common - which would then permit a more precise focus on a
narrower range of explanatory variables.
Combined with the use of rational-choice working hypotheses, then, structured
comparisons within varying subsets of cases seem to be our best hope for building a body
of generalizable knowledge about the causal relations between types of policy challenges,
types of institutional structures, and actor orientations. Moreover, by switching between
overlapping subsets of cases defined by either common challenges, or common actor
orientations or common institutions, we should be able to increase our confidence in the
explanations discovered in each of these dimensions. These explanations will surely not
amount to a general and comprehensive theory, but they will go beyond the ad-hoc
explanations that are otherwise characteristic of historical case studies (Scharpf 2000b).
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Endnotes
1 Most of my examples will be taken from the fields which I know best - cross-national
comparative studies of welfare-state and employment policy responses to changes in the
international economic environment (Scharpf 1991; Scharpf and Schmidt 2000).
2 Worse yet, if such case studies are written with the self-conscious intent of producing
inductive generalizations, they are likely to contribute to the endless cycle of over-
generalized propositions and false falsifications that plagues not only the study of
European politics (Scharpf 1999b).
3 Another interesting combination of methods is used by Hicks (1999) who relies on
multivariate regressions where quantitative time-series data are available, but resorts to
Ragin's (1987) "qualitative comparative analysis" where only qualitative data can be
obtained.
4 "Historical institutionalism", the third strand discussed in these overviews, is primarily
interested in the path-dependent evolution of institutional forms (Steinmo and Thelen
1992; Pierson 1997), but has no distinct theory of its own about the way institutions
influence actors' choices. Some authors lean more toward rational-choice assumptions,
others toward social-constructivist interpretations.
5 I should add that my presentation of the differences between the two is also
overdrawn. For a more integrative discussion, see Thelen (1999). From the rational-
choice side, a useful theoretical bridge is built by Lindenberg's (1989) concept of socio-
culturally defined "production functions" through which (or the social roles in which) the
abstract individual self-interest in physical well-being and social recognition must be
concretely pursued. For the organizational self-interest of corporate actors, this concept
seems even more pertinent.
6 Preferences, in our view must be understood as relatively stable ("pre-strategic")
criteria for the evaluation of outcomes, rather than as tentative commitments to a
particular strategy (which may of course be changed quite easily by "arguments"
providing new information). If this distinction is kept in mind, much fruitless debate over
the need to "endogenize preferences" in analyses of policy interactions could be avoided.
7 A third dimension is defined by identity concepts that may be more specific than
institutionalized norms and role obligations (Scharpf 1997, chapter 3).8 The point is nicely made in the dictum, ascribed to Lyndon Johnson, that "you got to
be re-elected to be a statesman".
9 See the reference to "production functions" in note 5, above.
10 It is puzzling that in modeling the effect of institutional rules on policy choices,
Tsebelis (1995; 1999a) considers only the "goal" dimension (expressed by the ideological
distance between veto players) while ignoring the "maintenance" dimension (e.g., the
effect of competitive incentives on the organizational self-interest of corporate actors and
hence on their willingness to reach agreement).
11 In this regard, the approach discussed here differs from the "analytic-narratives"
approach (Bates et al.1998) which expects rational-choice analyses to provide complete
explanations of historically unique cases.
12 The same kind of descriptors may be used to characterize wage-setting systems.
Here, effective decisions may, again, be vertically centralized and horizontally
concentrated in the arena of peak-level negotiations among monopoly associations of
capital and labor; located at the level national industrial sectors and branches; or
decentralized to regional negotiations, to firm-level or shop floor negotiations, or even to
individual employment contracts.
13 The center would be hopelessly overloaded if choices were in fact made there in
many cases (Downs 1967). Nevertheless, the fact that any decision could be centralized is
likely to affect the choices made "in the shadow of hierarchy" at the level of departments
or agencies (Scharpf 1997, chapter 9).
14 I will not here go into intricacies of when it is useful to ascribe actor qualities to
corporate and collective actors, and when it is necessary to focus on sub-units thereof or
even on individuals (Scharpf 1997, chapter 3), except to note that in general the
incentives for individuals acting in the name of corporate and collective actors are closely
linked to their success in terms of organizational self-interest.
15 The celebrated independence of the German Bundesbank could have been abolished
by ordinary legislation. That it was maintained even in major conflicts with governments
of the day, from Konrad Adenauer to Helmut Kohl, was due to broad public support for
its institutional independence.
16 More precisely, the efficiency of the outcome depends entirely on the underlying
constellations of actor interests. If they correspond to a "Battle of the Sexes" - which is
the constellation that Carey (this volume) is primarily considering - mutual adjustment
may be highly efficient. A real-world example was the adjustment of German unions
after 1975 to the monetary policy announced annually by the Bundesbank. But if the
underlying constellation should resemble a Chicken Game or the Prisoner's Dilemma,
mutual adjustment would produce highly undesirable policy outcomes. A real-world
example was the inflationary wage competition among British unions in the 1970s
(Scharpf 1987).
17 Negotiated coordination may take two forms: "Negative coordination" merely avoids
policies that would have negative external effects on other policy areas, whereas
""positive coordination" attempts to maximize the gains from cooperation (Scharpf 1997,chapter 6).
18 Blom-Hansen (1999) points to a second mechanism facilitating effective problem
solving in Scandinavian countries, namely the government's choice among alternative
arenas of decision making - parliamentary, intergovernmental, and corporatist.
19 Such conditions are most likely to occur in countries where an "activist"
constitutional court is deeply involved in substantive policy choices - which is true of
courts in Germany and Denmark, and increasingly in Italy and France. In that sense,
constitutional courts may be able to create the very political deadlocks which George
Tsebelis (1999a) sees as their major source of power.
20 Competitive incentives may be softened by expectations of an imminent return to
government. Thus, in Sweden in the early 1990s, opposition social democrats
collaborated with the conservative government in designing cuts in welfare-state
expenditures they considered necessary. For the Netherlands in the 1980s, it is also
suggested that the social democrats did not attack on the unpopular reforms of the
christian-liberal government because they hoped to join a future coalition with the
christian democrats (Green-Pedersen 1999).
21 There is a parallel in International Relations, where the "Realist" school assumes a
dominance of competitive incentives that force states to pursue "relative", rather than
"absolute gains" (Waltz 1979) whereas "Liberal" theorists assert the theoretical possibility
and practical importance of international agreements capturing "absolute" gains from
cooperation (Keohane 1984).
22 The exception are institutions that are explicitly designed to serve a single purpose -
as may be true of the European Central Bank which is supposed to be exclusively
committed to price stability.
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